

24 August 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard Lehman
Associate Director, Substantive Support/NFAC

FROM :
Chief, Requirements & Evaluation Staff/NFAC

SUBJECT : Contribution to Warning Paper

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1. Paragraph one of the notes you gave to me on 22 August asked for development of four functions derived from an earlier paper. You identified the functions as:

- ° coordination function
- ° analytic function
- ° discipline or reinforcing function
- ° challenge function

2. Some random thoughts on those functions follow.

Coordination

3. The National Warning 'nervous system' has become extremely complex since World War II and this complexity requires coordination to insure smooth and coherent functioning. In keeping with the nervous system analogy, we must have a nerve center (the coordination function) or the myriad of sensor neurons and motor neurons will react in a spasmodic, uncontrolled manner to stimulation. There must be a coordinating mechanism to insure that operating procedures are consistent with methodologies, that methodologies take full advantage of technologies, that technologies are improved or developed to support policy and methodology, and to insure that collection efforts are managed to support the analytic function.

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4. The HPSCI Staff report on warning highlights the lack of coordination between collection and analytic activities. The report mentions (p 55) " . . . reports written about every intelligence failure have indicated that enough intelligence was collected to prompt a warning; the major reasons for failure lay elsewhere. Yet, the first and most invariable response to any past crisis . . . has been to increase collection activities . . . " The coordination function is clearly needed to insure that there will be an appropriate division of effort between the collectors and the analysts and that their efforts are appropriately integrated.

Analysis

5. There are many schools of thought concerning the role of analysis in the indications and warning arena. The broad divisions are between those who favor the dominance of collection over analysis or vice versa and those who favor quantitative analysis over the more traditional methods. There are many combinations of these four groups and none of their alliances seem to be permanent. We should take this fluid situation into our deliberations.

6. The various analytic elements in the Intelligence Community have established audiences for their product, there are familiar art forms for their analytical judgments, each element has feed-back loops established with collectors of raw information and the consumers of the finished intelligence. There is an interdependence among the collectors and analysts wherein the collector relies upon the analyst for continuous refinement of collection guidance. There is an interdependence also between the analysts and the consumers of intelligence although it is not so evident. There often are policy initiatives that are essential to warning analysis.

7. There is a danger that the informal communications channels, interdependence, and acceptance will be lost if the warning analysis function is placed in a new and separate organization. There appear to be substantial reasons for maintaining a dispersed warning analysis network with an analytic nerve center function performed by a small staff responsive to a senior warning officer.

Discipline

8. It is simple to issue an order that all analytic elements in the Community are responsive for warning. It is difficult to

keep the warning responsibility at the forefront when the analysts are focussed on other tasks the majority of the time. A good case can be made for assigning more specific warning tasks to the individual NIOs. They are bureaucratically positioned to review warning events on a Community basis and the activity is consistent with their other duties. This sort of NIO activity, especially if combined with quantitative techniques sponsored by a special warning staff, would greatly reinforce awareness of the warning mission.

9. We still would be faced with the problem of crises developing across the lines of geographic or functional responsibilities of NIOs and offices. There remains the need for one senior officer who can be free of regional or functional constraints and continuously reinforce institutional awareness of the warning mission.

Challenge

10. There is no need to belabor the requirement for a challenge function. We have had a multitude of proposals for challenge teams and devil's advocates. These are possible but expensive. They are expensive and their utility will be short lived. The challenge team, the devil's advocates, etc., are all susceptible to settling into ruts in the same way as are those whom they are to challenge. Manipulation, by one senior officer responsible for warning, of the naturally diverse opinion within the Community can provide challenge.